RAILROAD REORGANIZATION AGREEMENTS.
During the past four years of business depression no branch
of the law has been brought more prominently before the public than that which governs corporate, and particularly railroad
securities. The inability of the great railroad companies to
meet the recurring interest on perhaps one-third of the total
outstanding indebtedness, has resulted in their creditors asking
for the assistance of the courts, and we have become very
familiar with the spectacle of receivers appointed by the courts
administering the affairs of many of the leading railroads. It
is not my purpose, within the limits of this brief article, to discuss the manner of the appointment of receivers and to inquire whether their administration has been, to use an analogy
from a related branch of the law; for the benefit or for the
detriment of the corporate creditors. I desire simply to call
attention to some of the striking features of the so-called reorganizations, by which alone it has been found possible to
terminate the receivership and to restore the property to the
control of its original owners, viz., the bondholders and stockholders.
It is fair to observe at the outset that a receivership, and
particularly a railroad receivership, is in itself a direct invitation
to some such agreement on the part of the company's creditors. The attitude of a court, upon assuming control of such
a property, must necessarily be a willingness to preserve the
assets from execution and sale for a reasonably short time only,
and if, at the expiration of such reasonable time, it is evident
that the company is unable to meet its current obligations, the
,court will then not only permit but urge the holders of the
unpaid securities to insist upon their legal rights, usually by a
foreclosure sale, unless all parties in interest can agree upon
some plan by which the road can be placed upon a solvent, or
at least an apparently solvent basis; in other words, unless a
reorganization agreement can be framed and carried out.
More than once during the pendency of the recent receivership
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of the Philadelphia & Reading Railroad Company (which lasted
over four years) it was intimated by the court that the court
would have itself to terminate the receivership, unless some
speedy steps were taken by the interested parties.
As just indicated, there are ordinarily two alternatives for
security holders during the rec.eivership: either, first, the
mortgage creditors, whose interest is unpaid, may stand upon
their strict legal rights and press for a foreclosure and sale,
thus practically cutting out the inferior mortgage creditors, if
any, and the general creditors and stockholders; or, secondly,
rather than lose the privileges conferred by a charter, which
would be forfeited by such judicial sale, or for some other
reason, the creditors may agree upon some plan of reorganization, which includes among other features (I) the raising of a
fund to meet necessary expenses (including especially expenses
incurred during the receivership) by assessments upon the
various classes of security holders, the amounts increasing in
proportion as the securities are less valuable, and (2) a scaling
down, whether of principal of security or rate of interest
thereon, or both, the object, of course, being so to reduce the
fixed charges that they can be met by the prospective income.
All this is familiar to layman as well as lawyer; the innovation, however, which has recently been introduced, is the conbination of these two alternatives, by which the reorganizers
practically say to the inferior creditors: "Either you will join
in our plan, or we will obtain a'decree of foreclosure, as a result
of which you will lose your investment altogethe-." Some of
the features of this position have seemed to the writer so important as to deserve special attention.
Here, again, however, before coming to the real question, a
preliminary observation is needed in order to avoid arly misconception. There is and there can be absolutely no legal
objection to the first mortgage creditors taking precisely the
position thus outlined. As they have a legal right to ask for
a foreclosure, if the case presented were the simple one of their
threatening to exercise this right, unless certain conditions,
however unreasonable, are complied with, no one could object;
the legal doubt that arises in practice is based upon the fact
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that owing to the complexity of the situation the reorganizers
must to some extent rely upon the assistance of the court in
order to accomplish their purpose. The grave doubt that
arises is whether the court ought, either nominally or actually,
to give assistance, and if so, upon what terms; and it is believed that the questions can be most clearly considered by
hastily surveying them in the form which they took in the
cases of Platt v. Philadelphia & Reading Railroad Co., C. C.
U. S., Eastern District of Pa., April Sessions, 1893, No. I, in
equity; Pennsylvania Company for Insurances on Lives and
Granting Annuities v. Philadelphia& Reading Railroad Company et al., C. C. U. S., Eastern District of Pa., April Sessions,
1895, No. 9, in equity, and Kurtz v. Philadelphia & ReadingRailroad Company et al., C. C. U.S., October Sessions, 1896,
No. 3, in equity.
The Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company was, on
February 20, 1893, insolvent; on that day a bill was filed by
Thomas C. Platt, a holder of certain third preference income
bonds, averring default in payment of interest due on these
bonds, refusal of the trustee either to foreclose the mortgage
securing them, or to take possession of and sell the mortgag~d
premises, and praying in the usual manner that receivers be
-appointed to preserve said property, pending foreclosure and
sale. This bill possessed all the characteristics of a strictly
foreclosure bill, but inasmuch as it contained a prayer for the
appointment of receivers of all the assets of the company,
receivers were appointed by the court for all the assets-a
point of some importance, as will hereafter appear--and the
receivers did enter upon and take possession of all the assets
of the company, including a considerable amount of property
-which was not covered by the mortgage which secured the
third preference income bonds. Two years later, on March 2,
.1895, a bill in equity was filed by the Pennsylvania Company
*for Insurances an Lives and Granting Annuities in the same
court (as of April Sessions, 1895, No. 9, in equity), as trustee
of the general mortgage and the first, second and third preference income mortgages, averring default in payment of interest
on all these securities, and praying for a foreclosure and sale.
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This bill has been expressly decided to be a foreclosure bill: 69
Fed. Rep. 482.
During this interval of two years several plans of reorganization had been proposed and discussed, but none had been
adopted by the security holders, although one had arrived at
* such a point that the receivers took cognizance thereof to the
extent of asking the leave of court to make certain payments
therein provided for. On December 14, 1895, however, a
"plan and agreement" was proposed, which was finally adopted
and became operative by receiving the assent of the requisite
number of security holders. It was proposed by the so-called
Olcott Committee, which had originally been formed: for the
purpose of representing the general mortgage bondholders,
but which now offered to give other security holders an interest in the proposed new company in consideration of the
payment of the usual assessments. Admitting the theoretical
right of the parties secured by the first mortgage to share
their advantages with others-and, in so doing, to make their
own terms-I desire to call attention to several incidents
which seem to differentiate this case from the ordinary one,
and to throw some doubt, at least, upon the validity of this
reorganization.
In the first place, although the third preference income
mortgage covered only a part of the property of the company, receivers had been appointed, upon. application of a
holder of third preference bonds, for the whole property.
This was apparently beyond the jurisdiction of the court. In
Scott, Intervener,v. Farmers'Loan and Trust Co., 6 9 .Fed. Rep.
17, a judgment creditor of the Northern. Pacific Railroad
Company applied to the court for leave to-sell land of the
company', which, though subject to the lien-of his judgment
and not subject to the lien of any mortgage, had, nevertheless,
been taken possession of by the receivers, who .refused to give
him any satisfaction. The court was clear in,its statement, of
his rights: "The jurisdiction possessed by a court. of.chancery
to foreclose a mortgage and appoint a receiver for the mortgaged property pending the foreclosure, gives it-no jurisdiction. or power to seize or take into its custody or control,
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through a receiver or otherwise, property of the debtor which
is not covered by the mortgage." And the court granted
Scott immediate relief. This decision is in accordance with
the statement of the law contained in Gluck & Becker on Receivers, § 66: "The right of the mortgagees cannot extend
beyond the property mortgaged, and the right of the receiver
must necessarily have the same limitation." Nor is this distinction between mortgaged and unmortgaged assets in the
hands of a receiver an unimportant one. In the Northern Pacific
case the vast land grants to the company were unmortgaged,
and in the Philadelphia and Reading case we may judge of
the value of unmortgaged property by the following description of assets which are to be covered by the new general
mortgage, though not included under the old one, and a
fortiori under the preference income mortgage: "The new
general mortgage will have a first lien upon a majority or
more of the -capital stock of various companies in the system
owning 448 miles of railroad . . . These 448 miles embrace

properties which are essential to the system, no part of which
is covered by the present general mortgage. The securities
thus to be pledged earned last year an income of $585,ooo,
of which $448,oo was actually received by the Philadelphia
and Reading Railroad Company in the way of dividends,
the remainder being retained for betterments and working
capital. The new mortgage will thus have the security
of a vast amnqunt of valuable property in addition to that
afforded by the present general, mortgage." It is, therefore, submitted, first, if the Platt bill was. a foreclosure billas it appears to be in substance and in form, in spite of a very
general prayer-the receivers appointed under it should have
no right to possess the property not covered by the third
preference income mortgage; and, secondly, if it can fairly be
regarded as a general creditors' bill, the fact should not be lost
sight of that, so far as unmortgaged assets are concerned, the
receiver holds principal and income thereof for the equal
benefit of mortgage and general creditors alike. Whether we
rely on those cases which declare that the property of an insolvent corporation is a trust fund for the benefit of its cred-
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itors (Graham v. R. R. Co., 102 U. S. 148; R. R. Co. v. Ham,
I 14 U. S. 587), or on those holding that the claim of unsecured creditors amounts to an equitable lien (Farmers'Loan
& Trust Co., 45 Fed. Rep. 518), or no, it is perfectly clear
that the court should, through its receivers, give no preference
as to unmortgaged property to any class of creditors.
In the second place, let us look at the financial administration of the receivers. Their reports to the stockholders of
their conduct of the road show that the average annual earnings of the company during the four years, 1892-5, were
(about) $0,700,000, while the average fixed charges for the
same period, including interest on receivers' certificates and
car trusts, were (about) $ Io,ooo,ooo-in other words, that the
road was in a solvent condition. Why, then, was the interest
on the general mortgage not paid? Because, during the receivership, $3,6oo,ooo was spent for betterments and equipment, with respect to which three circumstances should be
noted: (I) That this sum was in considerable part made up
of income from unmortgaged assets; (2) That, while not paid
in the form of interest to the mortgagees, it nevertheless redounded to their benefit by increasing their security for the
repayment of their principal; and (3) That the non-payment
of interest was in accordance with the wishes or, at least, not
against the wishes of the committee, which, all the while, was
"representing the interests of the general mortgage bondholders. It is not intended to intimate by this assertion that
the committee was acting in anywise improperly or beyond
its legal rights; on the contrary, it is believed that it was per-fectly justified, both legally and morally, in awaiting its own
time to foreclose, and in using the threat -of foreclosure as a
lash" to bring junior security holders into its plan. The fact,
however, is important, and the committee's appreciation of the
situation is proved by the following quotation from its circular
of September I9,1894: "It is thus apparent that the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company has, during the past
three years, earned the interest upon the general mortgage
bonds, but the large car trust payments have made it impossible to pay the general mortgage interest during the receiv-
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ership." We quote also from the plan of reorganization of
December 14, 1895: "The security for the present general
mortgage bonds is ample, but a reorganization has become
necessary through the creation of debts, which have proved a
drain upon the resources of the company and have necessitated a diversion of its income." Nor can the committee be
justly charged with any effected concealment of its control of
the situation, or of the means by which it proposed to carry
its purpose into effect; its plan of reorganization begins
with the statement that "a decree for the foreclosure of the
general mortgage is expected shortly to be entered."
The rest of the "history of the case" need not detain us
long. The decree for foreclosure, rendered necessary by the
fact that all of the creditors were not parties to the plan of reorganization, was duly entered on the first day of May, A. D.
1896, which provided, in substance, that in default of certain
payments therein specified on or before certain dates therein
mentioned, the entire assets of the company should be sold in
the manner therein provided for.
The real character of such foreclosure sales is generally
known, and, indeed, has been judicially described by the court
of highest authority in our own country. In Canada Rwy.
Co. v. Gebkard, 1o9 U. S. 527, Chief Justice Waite said: "It
rarely happens in the United States that foreclosures of railway
mortgages are anything less than the machinery by which the
arrangements between the creditors and other parties in interest
are carried into effect and a reorganization of the affairs of the
corporation under a new name brought about." The reason
for this was thus explained by Strong, J., in Sage v. Railroad
Co., 99 U. S. 334-340: "In such a case as the present the
first mortgage bondholders are the only persons who can become parties, and they only because they need not pay their
hid in cash." It is not denied, again, that, the first mortgage
bondholders have a perfect legal right to hold foreclosure proceedings as.a-whip over, the junior security holders; but it- is
submitted that the court; conscious as it must be of the fact,
that its decree.may be used simply as the machinery for forcing through; against dissenting security holders, some plan- of
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reorganization, should be very careful to see, first, that the
parties praying for the decree are equitably as well as legally
entitled to it, and, secondly, that the decree itself be so framed
as to protect and further the rights of all parties in interest.
The considerations have already been mentioned which bear
upon the equitable rights of the first mortgage bondholders in
this case. With respect to the decree itself it may be observed
(I) that, although entered in proceedings instituted by mortgage bondholders, it ordered the sale as well of the unmortgaged assets of the company; and (2) that, as is the almost
invariable practice in such cases, the parcels in which the
property was to be sold were so grouped and arranged that it
was almost impossible for any other independent bidder to
estimate their value, so as to frame a bid-a circumstance
which redounded to the advantage of the first mortgage bondholders (represented by the managers of the plan, who were
authorized to pay for their bid by the deposit of bonds in their
possession).
The sale thus ordered was not permitted to take place with"out an effort to forestall it on the part of those creditors who
were not parties to the reorganization agreement. A bill in
equity (to C. C. U. S., Oct. Sess. 1896, No. 3, in equity)
was promptly filed by W. W. Kurtz, the holder of certain, delinquent bonds of the Philadelphia, Reading and New. England
Railroad Company, payment of principal and interest of which
had been guaranteed by the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company; an injunction against the sale was prayed for,
and an elaborate argument had in which the validity of the reorganization was attacked and defended on very broad grounds.
A decision on the merits would have been a very valuable
addition to the legal literature on the subject, but unfortunately
(from this view) the refusal of the injunction-was based upon
an agreement (not mentioned heretofore because of no general
importance) which the court construed as a promise on the
part of this class of creditors not to delay the sale.
The argument upon which the validity of the reorganization was chiefly attacked, was the broad proposition that a court
of equity, whose maxim is " Equality is equity," cannot and
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will not look favorably on a plan which gives certain of the
creditors an opportunity to share in the new company (or, in
other words, in the assets of the old company which have
been bought in by the new, or transferred to it), while
refusing the same privilege to other creditors of equal equity.
The first answer to this was, the trustee's right to foreclosure
could not be affected by a provision in the reorganization
agreement made a year after suit begun, and to which it was
not a party, or by any policy indicated in that agreement or
carried out in pursuance thereto; but as if fearing that the
facts above recited, together with the fact that the trustee and
the" managers" had been represented throughout by the same
able counsel who had prescribed one harmonious course of
action, might be construed an agreement in fact, though not
in name, on the part of the trustee, it was further contended
that the reorganization agreement was perfectly lawful, and
that, therefore, an actual joinder in it by the trustee would not
have constituted any objection to the decree.
It must be conceded that, admitting the undoubted right of
the bondholders to foreclosure, the sale migzt, nevertheless, be
rendered invalid by reason of a previous agreement for its
purchase, provided that agreement was illegal. In Railroad Co.
v. Howard,7 Wall. 392 (1868), which is the first important case
on the subject, a sale under a mortgage was held invalidated
by a previous agreement between the mortgagees and the
stockholders, under which the stockholders were entitled to
a share of the proceeds of the sale-and this although the road
was mortgaged so far above its real value that on a sale in
open market it did not bring nearly enough to pay the mortgage debt. The proceeding was a bill in equity filed by the
general creditors of the company who obtained a decree that
that part of the proceeds of the sale which would have been
received by the stockholders, should be paid to complainants.
It was strenuously argued for appellants, that the agreement
was simply a gift of the mortgagees to the stockholders, of
which no one could complain; but the decree was affirmed by
the Supreme Court, per Clifford, J., whose opinion was based
upon the consideration that the capital stock of a corporation
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is a trust fund for the benefit of its creditors, and that the
stockholders can by no contrivance appropriate any part of it
to their own use until creditors are paid. *Whether regarded
as an illustration of the trust fund doctrine, or simply as a case
of fraud, the case was doubtless properly decided, and has
been generally followed as an authority. It having been thus
determined that a distribution of the proceeds of a sale to
stockholders was illegal and the need still existing of a
reorganization agreement which would confer some rights on
the owners of the property, the plan now generally adopted
was devised, to wit: of framing an agreement under which
the assets of the old company should be bought in by a new
company, in which new company all stock and bondholders
of the old company should be allotted certain stocks or
bonds, the amount depending on the relative value of the
old securities and the amount of assessments paid by the
owners thereof. This plan is well illustrated in Pennsylvania
Transportation Co.'s Appeal, IOI Pa. 576 (1882). The
Oil Creek and Allegheny River Railroad Company having
defaulted in the payment of interest on its mortgage, its
property was sold under a decree of foreclosure. The
bondholders, stockholders and nearly all of the unsecured
creditors had entered into an agreement which expressed their
purpose to unite for the purpose of protecting their common
interests, to buy in the property at the sale under the pending
proceedings, and organize a new corporation in which all should
have an interest. This plan was carried out, the property
was sold, bought in by a committee, and the Pittsburgh, Titusville & Buffalo Railroad Company became the
legal owner of the road. A bill in equity was filed by Pennsylvania Transportation Company (one of the few general
creditors who did not participate in the reorganization, apparently because its claim was considered unjust by the old
company) against the Pittsburgh, Titusville & Buffalo Railroad Company, praying that this sale be decreed fraudulent
as to complainant and that the new company be ordered to
pay the amount for complainant's judgment. Exceptions to
the master's report recommending a decree granting the
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prayer of the bill were sustained, the bill was dismissed and
the decree dismissing the bill was affirmed by the Supreme
Court, per Mercur, J. Two extracts from the opinion are
quoted: "On the hearing in the present case before the
master, it was urged that the default in the payment of
interest on May I, 1874 was not bonafide, but fraudulent, and
that the default and sale were brought about with intent to
defraud the appellant. The master found that these facts are
nowhere charged in the bill, and are not sufficiently shown by
the testimony." Again: " The argument is that a certain
written agreement, entered into between the purchasers before
the sale, changed the effect thereof,-in substance that it
operated as a fraud on the appellant." After setting out the
terms of the agreement: "What then was there illegal or
invalid in so agreeing? It was not to depress the property or
cause it to be sold for a sum less than its value, but to enhance
it. It has been held that bondholders may unite for the
purchase of the property : Ketchum v. Duncan, 6 Otto, 659;
Sage v. R. R. Co., 9 Id. 342. It is a fair and wise course for
them to pursue to prevent a sacrifice of their property. If
they may so unite, we see no valid reason why stockholders
may not unite with them in a purchase at a sale made in good
faith. They, as well as bondholders, are interested in protecting their proper-ty from sacrifice, and may resort to like lawful
means to protect it." Another illustration of modern methods
is Smith v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co., 18 Wis. 17
(i 864). An extract from the opinion of Paine, J., shows the
ground of the decision. " The complainant avers that there
being an outstanding mortgage to the trustees to secure the
bondholders, an agreement was made between the company
and the holders of the bonds secured by said mortgage, and
said trustees, that a sale should take place on the mortgage
' for the benefit of said company, its stockholders and creditors;'
that there should be a reorganization of said company under
another name, and that the stockholders of said mortgagor
company and unsecured creditors should become stockholders
of said reorganized company, etc. It also avers that the sale
did take place in pursuance of such agreement, and that- the
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-purchasers reorganized ' said corporation under the name of
the Chicago & Northwestern Railroad Company,' which is
this defendant. The theory of the plaintiff is, that these
allegations show that the present company is nothing but the
old company under another name, and is, therefore, liable for
the old debts. But we have come to the conclusion, that
although the complaint says the agreement was that the old
company should be reorganized, and that it was reorganized,
-yet it shows that a new company was to be and was organized."
The authorities cited sustain the following propositions:
First, that a reorganization agreement, otherwise valid, cannot
be defeated because it results in a sale of all the assets of the
-old company to a new company, and that the new company is
not liable for the debts of the old: Smitli v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co., supra. Not only so, but such a con,summation is so necessary to the maintenance of railroad enterprises that statutes have been passed in many states expressly
conferring upon purchasers at foreclosure sale the right to form
.a corporation which shall have the franchises of the old company: N. Y. Laws of 1850, Ch. 140, § 5, amended by Laws
of 1854, Ch. 282, and N. Y. Laws of 1873, Ch. 71O; also N.
Y. Laws 'of 1874, Ch. 430; Beach on Railroads, §§ 766-7.
Second, that the sale under the reorganization agreement may
be disregarded by non-assenting creditors, provided the agreement is in the .eyes of the law illegal: Railroad Co. v. Howard,
,supra. The difficulty that remains, however, and it is one
which is not much cleared up by the decisions, is to determine
when such an agreement is in the eyes of the law illegal.
Some points are of course established; as, that the stockholders shall not be allowed to receive part of the proceeds of
the sale to the detriment of any creditors (Railroad Co. v.
Howard, supra), or, that an agreement by. which the price
,obtainable at the sale should be cut down, is voidable by the
creditors injured (Pennsylvania Transportation Co.'s Appeal,
mepra). These decisions can readily be .complied with (I) by
the new company, instead
giving the stockholders only stock in.
of cash, and (2).by bidding a large nominal sum which, though
formidable in name, is easily accomplished in fact by paying in
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first mortgage bonds, and it need hardly be said that no reorganization agreement could succeed unless it were agreed to
by substantially all of the holders of such bonds. Two vital
and unavoidable questions remain, however, and they formed
the foundation of the argument in the Kurtz case; is the
agreement illegal if (I) the sale was one that could have been
avoided by the first mortgage bondholders had they adhered
to their legal right to have the income paid to them and not
expended upon new rolling stock (or otherwise), however
needed? and if (2) an opportunity is not given to all the
creditors to take part in the reorganized company?
With regard to the first point, perhaps it will be conceded
that a needless sale is an illegal sale; the almost insuperable
difficulty is to prove that it was needless in the face of abundant
bona fide testimony as to the need of the diverting expenditures, the fact that these expenditures are made by receivers,
possibly with the direct approval of the court, etc. It is submitted, however, (i) that a court should hesitate long before
authorizing the diversion of funds from the payment of mortgage interest, remembering that practically such diversion
simply adds to the security of the first mortgage bondholder,
at the same time resulting in an increase of his claim, so that
in case of foreclosure or reorganization the inferior or general
creditors are handicapped to the extent of the sums diverted;
and (2) that the court, though always favoring an equitable
plan of reorganization, should carefully watch, lest its process
be abused to aid in any plan which is inequitable-a thought
which brings us naturally to the next point of invalidity, viz.,
is a scheme of reorganization illegal, because it denies a share
to all of the creditors of the old company?
It is believed that this question has never been categorically
answered by the courts, in spite of the fact that it is the allimportant question in most reorganizations; at least an examination of the numerous recent authorities has not resulted in
finding a single discussion. To be sure, in Pennsylvania
Tamportation Co.'s Appeal, supra, the agreement was sustained, though the plaintiff, at least, was not invited to participate, the court apparently being satisfied because "nearly-all "
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of the general creditors were allowed to come in; but even
here it must not be overlooked that the court refrained from
directly upholding the position that is deducible from its decision, and also that the plaintiff's claim was there disputed by
the old company, possibly on valid grounds, so that it did not
come before the court in a favorable light. Apart from this
decision, however, which may or may not be a precedent upon
this question (especially in Pennsylvania courts), is it desirable
that the courts should countenance any plan of reorganization
which does not invite every creditor to participate? The courts
have declared their belief that reorganization agreements,
while usually necessary and often not only desirable but indispensable, are susceptible of abuse, and have proclaimed that
where they are used for a fraudulent purpose they will be held
incapable to accomplish it. What is to prevent them from
saying.to the first mortgage bondholders: "Your interest is
not paid; you are legally and morally justified in asking for
a decree of the court to aid you in the recovery of your money,
and if you ask it for that purpose, you shall have it. But if
you do not want the property actually sold, if you desire to
retain your interest therein, and especially if you are willing
and have agreed that so far as you are concerned the present
owners may retain an interest therein, then we say to you that
we will not, at your request, order a merely nominal sale unless you give a fair and reasonable opportunity to every creditor to retain his claim on the existing assets by conferring upon
him an interest in the new company. We will not, either in
fact or in name, permit a debtor so to transfer his property that
he will retain the control thereof, while his creditors cannot
lay hold of it."
It is to be observed that this is the practice in England.
Prior to 1867 the affairs of a bankrupt railway were arranged
by an Act of Parliament (Cumberland Railway Co.'s Scheme,
L. R. Ch. 294), and it is believed that these acts uniformly
recognize the principle about to be stated. By the Railway
Companies Act, 1867, 30 and 31 Vict. c. 127, provision is
made (inter alia) for "schemes of arrangements" between
railway companies and their creditors. The scheme includes
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.a filing of the plan in court and advertisement thereof. When
the plan is assented to by the holders of three-fourths in value
-of each class of creditors, and by the shareholders at an extraordinary meeting called for the purpose, application is made
to the court for confirmation of the plan. This is done if the
court be satisfied that " no sufficient objection to the scheme
.has been established," and the scheme thereupon becomes
.binding upon all, parties interested, whether assenting or not.
The act accomplishes two very important purposes: (I) It
recognizes the right of the majority to rule, and thereby does
away with a person who is extremely difficult to deal with,
viz., a small minority creditor or bondholder, (see Hollister v.
Stewart, I I I N. Y. 644, 659; Shaw v. Railroad Co., IOO
U. S. 6o5; Gates v. Boston R. R. Co., 53 Conn. 333);
secondly, and more to our present purpose, it places in
the discretion of the court the approval of all reorganization
plans, and, needless to say, that discretion may be and is used
to protect the interests of all classes of creditors. Of course,
such legislation is entirely out of the question in our own
,country, where both the United States and State legislatures
-are forbidden by constitutions to impair the obligation of tontracts, and where, therefore, the mortgage creditor could
neither be compelled to join in a reorganization nor be deprived of his right to apply for a decree of foreclosure: See
Canada Southern R. R. v. Gebhard, 109 U. S. 527. Itis submitted, however, that the English practice is not without its
-value for the courts of our own country; if the rule laid down
by them is fair and equitable, and if it cannot be accomplished
by statutory legislation here, is there not so much the greater
reason for the courts of equity to extend their. protection to
those who certainly need it by declaring that to be a fraud in
law, which is a gre,',at injustice in fact? Or, to put the other
side- of the case, what inequity or hardship can there be in
compelling those who ask the court's aid to do equ~ity to
others ? I know it will be answered that the court cannot
inquire into the motives of a party who is asking for a decree
to which he is legally entitled; granted-but is -that any
reason why the court should not take the agreement by which
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that party has modified his legal rights, and declare that, as he
now comes to carry out a plan not contemplated by law, he
must satisfy the court that that plan is just and equitable ? It
would seem hard to find a more opportune occasion for the
court of equity to have recourse to its old maxim.
(It is, perhaps, proper to add that some of the questions discussed may come before the court in Kurtz v. Philadelphia&
Reading Railroad et al., C. P. 2, Sept. Term, 1896, No. 408.
This suit, which is the sequel of the Kurtz case above referred
to, is a bill in equity directed mainly against the " reorganization managers," and praying that they account to complainant for
the assets which came into their hands through the assessments
which formed a part of the plan; in addition to the invalidity of
the reorganization, and perhaps prior in importance to that, the
argument is suggested that the reorganization managers
become trustees of these funds for the relief of the stockholders,
and that their duty as trustees will not be fulfilled unless all
creditors are paid or allowed to participate, as otherwise the
stockholders remain individually liable, by virtue of an amendment to its charter, for the debts of the Philadelphia & Reading
Railtoad Company. A demurrer has been filed to this bill, but
no decision has been as yet rendered by the court.)
Reynolds D. Brown.

